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Against the background of the current discussion on the introduction of statutory minimum 
wages in Germany, this paper analyzes the potential employment and fiscal effects of such a 
policy. Based on estimated labor demand elasticities obtained from a structural labor demand 
model, the empirical results imply that the introduction of minimum wages in Germany will be 
associated with significant employment losses that are concentrated among marginal and 
low- and semi-skilled full-time workers. Even though minimum wages will lead to increased 
public revenues from income taxes and social security benefits, they will result in a significant 
fiscal burden, due to increased expenditures for unemployment benefits and decreased 
revenues from corporate taxes. 
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2008. 1 Introduction
Hardly any other aspect of German labor market policy is currently debated more
intensely than the introduction of statutory minimum wages. Its opponents argue
that the installation of such a lower bound for wages into an already heavily
regulated labor market threatens to lead to a substantial increase of unemployment.
Undoubtedly, most German workers are covered in one way or another by collective
bargaining and the German labor market has been plagued by high and persistent
unemployment for a long time (see e.g. Haucap et al. 2007). Its proponents
rather point at the large market power that employers wield on the labor market
for unskilled workers, arguing that a moderate minimum wage might, at least in
principle, create and not destroy jobs.1
Advocates of the introduction of a statutory minimum wage feel vindicated
by the experience of other countries, because the evidence is not overwhelming
that the introduction or rearrangement of minimum wages in the UK or the US,
respectively, led to sizeable losses of employment. Yet, its sceptics warn that any
innocuous results derived in a comparatively low-regulated labor market, such as
that of the UK, can hardly be a sensible guide for what to expect in the German
labor market. After all, the German labor market is dominated by corporatist
institutions, unions and employer associations alike, and is beset by a plethora of
regulations. Thus, yet another piece of regulation seems hardly desirable. What
is more, some observers have commented critically on the way that, with the
support of strong unions, German labor market incumbents in many sectors have
utilized minimum wages to protect themselves against national and international
competition. According to this view, the political support for the introduction of
a statutory minimum wage from unions and from part of the employers is thus to
be viewed as an attempt to extend this protection further, and will have additional
negative long-run e￿ects for the German economy (Haucap and Wey, 2008).
Unfortunately, existing empirical studies on the employment e￿ects of
minimum wages do not provide a clear guide to a more serious assessment of
these contradictory arguments.2 These studies typically follow one of two principal
identi￿cation strategies. Most studies estimate structural labor demand models and
use the estimated substitution elasticities to gauge the employment e￿ects of an
introduction or increase of minimum wage rates.3 These studies have been criticized
because of their strong identi￿cation assumptions. In particular, they usually
assume a competitive labor market, which appears somewhat unrealistic, at least
1See Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004) for a discussion of di￿erent theoretical models on the em-
ployment e￿ects of minimum wages.
2Brown (1999) and Neumark and Wascher (2007) provide surveys of the relevant empirical
literature.
3That labor costs might be important for ￿rms’ competitiveness and pro￿ts has been acknowl-
edged in many contexts, for instance in economic history (Labuske and Streb, 2008).
1for continental European economies. More recent studies often take another route
and invoke the idea of a natural experiment to estimate the employment e￿ects
of minimum wages in speci￿c applications.4 These studies rely on comparatively
weak identi￿cation assumptions, but they tend to lack external validity, i.e. their
results cannot be transferred to other contexts. In addition, by contrast to studies
applying a structural approach, quasi-experimental studies usually just address
short-run e￿ects. Nevertheless, the majority of the existing empirical studies ￿nd
negative employment e￿ects of minimum wages (Neumark and Wascher, 2007).
So far the empirical literature on minimum wages has concentrated exclusively
on employment e￿ects. This focus re￿ects the fact that minimum wages are
typically a measure of social policy in economies with a comparatively weak public
social security system. By contrast, not only does a minimum wage appear to be
an awkward instrument for poverty reduction in a country with a strong public
social security system such as Germany, its introduction may also be associated
with signi￿cant negative e￿ects on the public budget. To our knowledge, the study
by Bachmann et al. (2008) has been the ￿rst to suggest that ￿scal e￿ects might
be an important issue in this context. Our paper re￿nes this study and provides a
thorough econometric analysis. Since the concrete level of the statutory minimum
wage is a matter of intense political debate, we consider the potential consequences
of the introduction of gross hourly minimum wages of 5.00 e, 7.50 e, and 10.00 e,
respectively.
To provide such an assessment, we follow a research strategy that proceeds
in three steps. First, we use micro-level data to analyze the extent to which the
actual wages of German workers would be a￿ected by the introduction of di￿erent
minimum wage rates (Section 2). To this end we distinguish ￿ve di￿erent skill
groups and estimate the shares of workers in these groups whose current wages
lie below the three minimum wages under discussion, respectively. This step is
necessary, since ascertaining that there is any treatment worth considering should
always be the initial stage of an evaluation study, and minimum wages that are set
below the majority of actual wages will not lead to market reactions.5 Assuming
that the implementation of the statutory minimum wage will lift the wages of those
workers currently earning below this threshold up to this value, while leaving the
other workers una￿ected, we construct an estimate of the associated changes in
average wages in all ￿ve skill groups.
In a second step, we rely on the wage elasticities estimated in Jacobi and
Scha￿ner (2008) on the basis of a structural labor demand model, to translate
4The analysis by Card and Krueger (1994) is the seminal study using this identi￿cation strategy
in this context.
5This is what appears to be behind the results of Koenig and M￿ller (2007) regarding the
apparent absence of employment e￿ects of minimum wages in the West German construction
sector: no treatment, no e￿ect.
2these wage changes into the corresponding employment e￿ects for the di￿erent
types of workers (Section 3). In the ￿nal step, the estimates obtained in the ￿rst
two steps are used to analyze the e￿ects of minimum wages on public revenues and
expenditures (Section 4). In our concluding remarks (Section 5), we derive the
policy implications of our ￿ndings
Taken in a nutshell, the results of our empirical analysis suggest that the
introduction of a minimum wage rate of 7.50 e will lead to an employment reduction
of about 625,000 (full-time equivalent) jobs in West and more than 230,000 in East
Germany. These employment losses will be concentrated predominantly among
marginal workers and low- and semi-skilled full-time workers. The results further
indicate that the introduction of a minimum wage of 7.50 e will burden the public
budget by some 12 billion e or about one percent of the total public expenditures
in 2007. Thus, the case against the introduction of statutory minimum wages into
the German labor market seems quite strong.
2 Minimum Wages and the Wage Distribution
In this section we assess the e￿ects of several candidate minimum wage rates on
the wage distribution. Inspired by the current political discussion of statutory
minimum wages in Germany, we discuss the e￿ects of introducing wage ￿oors of
5.00 e, 7.50 e, and 10.00 e, respectively. This step is important for at least two
reasons. First, it allows gauging the actual relevance of minimum wages for the
labor market. After all, a minimum wage that is lower than the vast majority
of wages actually paid in the labor market could not be expected to lead to any
market reactions. Second, distinguishing ￿ve skill groups of workers we obtain
estimates of the increases in average hourly wages in each of these groups that
would be associated with the introduction of each of the candidate minimum wages.
Since our empirical strategy focuses on the substitutivity between di￿erent factors
of production, i.e. skill groups of workers, these estimates are required for the
analytical steps in the following sections.
Using data from the German Socio-economic Panel (GSOEP) for the year
2007, we calculate hourly wage distributions for ￿ve di￿erent groups of workers:
(i) marginal workers; (ii) part-time workers; (iii) full-time workers without an
occupational degree (low-skilled); (iv) full-time workers with an occupational
degree but without a university degree (semi-skilled); and (v) full-time workers
with a university degree (high-skilled). Hourly wages are constructed based on
gross monthly wages and weekly working hours. Weekly hours have been de￿ned
as the contractual weekly working hours if available, otherwise as actual weekly
working hours as reported by the individuals. Because of potential outliers at the
bottom and the top of the wage distribution, we excluded the lowest and highest
32.5 percent of hourly wages from the following calculations.6
Table 1 reports the average hourly wages and their 10th and 90th percentiles,
respectively, for the ￿ve di￿erent groups of workers, always distinguishing East
and West German workers. It also documents within-group wage dispersion in the
compressed form of a 90th/10th percentile ratio. In addition, the table reports the
aggregate numbers of full time-equivalent workers in the ￿ve di￿erent groups we
consider, which have been obtained using the BA-Employment Sample. Together
with the corresponding system of uncompensated price elasticities, these numbers
will be used in the following section to estimate the employment changes associated
with the introduction of statutory minimum wages.
Not surprisingly, average hourly wages are higher in West Germany. The
average wage of all workers in West Germany taken together exceeds even the
average wage of high-skilled workers in East Germany slightly. Thus, we would
expect the same candidate minimum wage to unfold more serious consequences in
East Germany than in the West. Furthermore, as indicated by the ratio of the 90th
to 10th percentile of the respective wage distribution, wage dispersion appears to
be higher in East Germany for all types of workers considered but the high-skilled.
It is highest for low-skilled full-time workers in both parts of Germany, while it
is only substantial for marginal and part-time workers in East, but not in West
Germany.
Based on these hourly wage distributions, we calculate the e￿ects of introduc-
ing the candidate minimum wage rates of 5.00 e, 7.50 e, and 10.00 e, respectively,
on average hourly wages in all ￿ve skill groups. We start from the insight that
before implementing the statutory minimum wage, the average wage for skill group
j = 1;:::;5, ¹ wj, can be expressed as the weighted average of the average wage of all
workers earning at most the candidate minimum wage ml, with l = 5:00;7:50;10:00,
¹ w
¡
jl, and the average wage of all workers earning more, ¹ w
+
jl. In this weighted average,
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jl, serve as the appropriate weights:









We then construct our estimates of the altered average wages in skill group j
after the introduction of the statutory minimum, ¹ ¹ wjl, assuming that wages above
6We also performed all estimations in this paper without trimming the data and when excluding
the lowest and highest 5 percent of the wages. The estimated e￿ects when trimming the data in
this way are slightly lower than those reported below, because less individuals are a￿ected by the
minimum wage, resulting in a lower wage compression. Accordingly, the estimated e￿ects when
not trimming the data are higher because of a higher wage compression. The results for these
analyses are available from the authors upon request.
4the candidate minimum wages are not a￿ected by their introduction:
¹ ¹ wjl = ½
¡





Hence we neglect the possibility that the introduction of a minimum wage shifts the
entire wage distribution. In the real world, this might very well happen, though,
because, for example, ￿rms try to realize a certain wage di￿erential between
di￿erent groups of workers to o￿er appropriate incentives (see, among others,
Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1994, Lazear and Rosen, 1981, and Rosen, 1986).
To provide an estimate of the magnitudes of the associated wage changes, we
construct measures of wage compression (cjl), de￿ned as the percentage change of
the average wage associated with the introduction of candidate minimum wages, i.e.
cjl =
µ




Table 2 shows that the wages of marginal, part-time, and low-skilled workers,
and in East Germany also of semi-skilled workers would be a￿ected severely by
the introduction of any of the candidate minimum wages. According to Table
2, a minimum wage of 5.00 e, for example, would a￿ect 18 and 56 percent of
low-skilled workers in West and East Germany, respectively. This number increases
to approximately 47 and 83 percent, if a minimum wage of 10.00 e were introduced.
Among semi-skilled workers, between 2 percent in West Germany and 6 percent
in East Germany would be a￿ected at a minimum wage of 5.00 e and between 13
and 39 percent at a minimum wage rate of 10.00 e. Except for a minimum wage
of 10.00 e in the East, high-skilled workers would hardly be a￿ected by any of the
candidate minimum wage rates currently discussed.
In total, taking the employment numbers of the BA-Panel into account, a
minimum wage of 7.50 e would a￿ect about 12 percent of all full-time-equivalent
workers or approximately 19.5 percent of all workers, which represents about 5
million workers. Using the GSOEP for the year 2004, Kalina and Weinkopf (2006)
obtained a very similar result. They calculate that the introduction of such a mini-
mum wage would a￿ect 4.9 million or approximately 15 percent of all employment
relationships. Based on the data from the Gehalts- und Lohnstrukturerhebung of
the German Statistical O￿ce for the year 2001, however, Ragnitz and Thum (2007)
conclude that only 2.3 million or approximately 14 percent of all workers receive
wages below 7.50 e. It is unclear, which factors are driving these di￿erences be-
tween the various studies. Candidate explanations are the use of di￿erent samples,
di￿erent de￿nitions of hourly wages or di￿erent sample years. However, all stud-
ies indicate that the number of workers likely to be a￿ected is economically relevant.
Table 2 further shows that a minimum wage of 5.00 e would only exert
small e￿ects on the wage distribution, leading to a wage compression of 1.1 and
5.6 percent for marginal workers and 1.6 and 22.1 percent for low-skilled full-time
5workers in West and East Germany, respectively, while its e￿ects on the average
wages of the other groups of workers would be negligible. A minimum wage of 7.50
e would, however, lead to signi￿cant changes. Such a minimum wage would result
in a wage compression of almost 9.3 and 20.3 percent among marginal workers in
West and East Germany, respectively, 6.5 and 48.6 percent among low-skilled, and
2.5 and 9.1 as well as 0.6 and 3.3 percent among part-time and semi-skilled workers,
respectively. Only a minimum wage rate of 10.00 e would also a￿ect the wage
distribution of (mainly East-German) high-skilled workers to a considerable degree.
In that case, wage compression for this group of workers would reach approximately
4.2 percent.
Overall, only a minimum wage considerably above 5.00 e would have the
potential to a￿ect an economically relevant number of workers in both parts of Ger-
many, in particular marginal, low-skilled, and part-time workers. Most speci￿cally,
a minimum wage of 7.50 e would lead to a sizeable wage compression for these
groups. Our analysis suggests that the minimum wage rates currently discussed in
the German public debate could be expected to lead to considerable reactions on the
labor market. Using the estimated changes in the wage distribution for these ￿ve
di￿erent types of workers as impulses, the following section investigates the employ-
ment e￿ects of the candidate minimum wages on the basis of empirically determined
own and cross-price elasticities of labor demand.
3 Employment E￿ects of Minimum Wages
When the government interferes into the labor market by setting the wage for a
speci￿c group of workers at a level that exceeds the previous value, this entails two
related consequences. First, it raises the relative price of these workers in their
role as a factor of production, and thus tends to price a fraction of them out of
the market. Correspondingly, at the heart of the public debate concerning the
introduction of minimum wages is the question whether it would lead to substantial
losses of employment among those workers who are destined to be directly a￿ected
by this minimum wage. Yet, a comprehensive debate has also to acknowledge that
￿ to the extent that workers of di￿erent skill groups are complements or substitutes
in the production process ￿ this statutory wage ￿oor will also a￿ect the employment
prospect of workers whose wages are considerably higher. Some groups of workers
might even bene￿t as substitutes. Thus, any thorough empirical assessment of the
employment e￿ects of minimum wages has to take these relationships into account.
That is, it should not only consider own-price elasticities of labor demand, but also
all relevant cross-price elasticities between di￿erent groups of workers.
Furthermore, this intervention raises the costs of production, reducing the
employers’ return on capital, and therefore threatens to lead to a lower aggregate
level of economic activity. This second consequence requires the estimation of
uncompensated elasticities of labor demand that jointly capture substitution
6and output e￿ects. By contrast, compensated labor demand elasticities, which
are usually applied in the existing literature on labor demand, only capture net
substitution e￿ects, i.e. they assume that output is constant (Frondel and Schmidt,
2000). Since this conventional approach seems inadequate, we explicitly strive to
assess the magnitudes of the relevant uncompensated elasticities.
Speci￿cally, we provide estimates of the employment e￿ects ¢Ljl of introduc-
ing a minimum wage ml for skill group j which are based on the combination of
compensated (cross-price) elasticities and scale e￿ects. With Lj denoting the num-










This expression acknowledges that the introduction of a statutory minimum wage
would alter the average wages in all ￿ve skill groups. These changes are expressed in
percentage terms as ¢wkl= ¹ wk. They are translated into e￿ects on the employment
of workers of each group j by cumulating, ￿rst, the compensated price elasticities
between skill group j and groups k = 1;:::;5, ´jk, and, second, a corresponding
output e￿ect due to the increased cost of labor. This second e￿ect is itself the
product of the labor demand elasticity with respect to changes in the output Y ,
´jY, and the elasticity of output Y with respect to a change in the price of input















i.e. the product of the elasticity of output with respect to the aggregate price ´ and
the elasticity of marginal costs MC with respect to changes in the price of factor k.























As a speci￿c input for our estimation of the employment e￿ects of minimum
wages according to expression (4), we utilize the compensated price-elasticities ´jk
estimated by Jacobi and Scha￿ner (2008). Together with a detailed description of
7these authors‘ empirical approach, these elasticities are reported in the Appendix.7
We further assume constant returns to scale, which implies that ´jY = 1 and use a
demand elasticity of ´ = ¡0:2, inspired by the estimates reported in Fitzenberger
and Franz (2001).
The estimated uncompensated elasticities are presented in Table 3. Note
that the output e￿ect is the same for all employment reactions triggered by the
same wage change, re￿ecting the assumption of constant returns to scale. Output
e￿ects are estimated to be particularly large when the wages of semi-skilled workers
increase. The own-wage elasticities are negative and the cross-price elasticities
positive suggesting that all worker groups are substitutes to each other, even after
taking output e￿ects into account. In West Germany the uncompensated cross-
price elasticities between marginal workers and part-time and high-skilled full-time
workers are not statistically signi￿cant, and in East Germany the cross-price elas-
ticities between marginal part-time workers and all other groups are insigni￿cant,
suggesting that this type of workers plays a di￿erent role in the production process
in the two regions of Germany. Part-time workers appear to be substitutes to
semi-skilled and high-skilled workers, whereas the cross-price elasticities between
part-time an low-skilled workers do not appear to be statistically signi￿cant in both
parts of Germany. Finally, di￿erently to West-Germany, the cross-price elasticities
between low-skilled and high-skilled full-time workers in East Germany are not
signi￿cant.
Maintaining the assumption explained in the previous section that in each
skill group only wages below the minimum wage are a￿ected by its introduction, we
use the estimated wage compression associated with di￿erent candidate minimum
wage rates reported in Table 2 to approximate the proportionate changes in wage
costs (¢wkl= ¹ wk) resulting from the introduction of minimum wages. The number
of employees in the ￿ve groups considered (Lj) as well as the respective total wage
sums are taken from columns (6) and (7) of Table 1. The output Y is derived from
national accounts (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2007b). Finally, since the elasticities
used to evaluate the employment e￿ects are estimates, we also report 95 percent
con￿dence intervals, which have been obtained by using bootstrapping with 500
replications.8
The estimated employment e￿ects of di￿erent minimum wage rates are
reported in Table 4, distinguishing East and West Germany. According to these
7All compensated own-price elasticities are statistically signi￿cant negative. In West Germany
all employment groups are estimated to constitute substitutes for each other. However, most of
the substitution elasticities are estimated to be rather small. The highest cross-price elasticities
are obtained between semi-skilled workers and the other groups. In East Germany low-skilled and
part-time workers as well as high-skilled and low-skilled workers are estimated to be complements.
In both cases, however, the estimated elasticities are not statistically signi￿cant.
8See Efron and Tibshirani (1993) for an introduction to the bootstrap method.
8estimates the introduction of each of these candidate minimum wages would have
negative employment e￿ects in both parts of Germany, which range from 161,391
employees in East Germany at a minimum wage rate of 5.00 e to 1.17 million
employees in West Germany at a minimum wage rate of 10.00 e. These negative
e￿ects are mainly the result of a decreasing employment among marginal and
part-time workers and low- and semi-skilled full-time workers, while high-skilled
full-time worker are not estimated to be a￿ected signi￿cantly.
Overall, the estimates suggest that the introduction of minimum wages in Ger-
many would have detrimental employment e￿ects, which increase with the minimum
wage rate. A minimum wage of 5.00 e, for example, would involve the loss of 523,000
jobs (or 2 percent of the total work-force), which increases to 1.5 million jobs (or
5.9 percent of the total work-force) at a minimum wage of 10.00 e. The part of the
estimated e￿ect which is due the output e￿ect is given in parentheses at the bottom
of the table. The share of the scale e￿ect depends on the worker group and the
amount of the minimum wage. Overall, the output e￿ects amount to 6 percent for
a minimum wage of 5.00 e and 20 percent for a minimum wage of 10.00 e.
4 Fiscal E￿ects of Minimum Wages
Based on the employment e￿ects predicted in the previous section, this section
analyzes the potential e￿ects of the introduction of minimum wages for the public
budget. To derive a comprehensive assessment, we separately consider the changes
in (i) revenues from individual taxes and social security contributions, (ii) revenues
from corporate taxes, (iii) expenditures for unemployment bene￿ts, social assistance
and active labor market policy, and (iv) expenditures for the supplement of the
income of marginal workers, respectively.
4.1 Revenues
The introduction of minimum wages exerts direct as well as indirect e￿ects on public
revenues from individual taxes and social security contributions. While the former
re￿ect the altered incomes of workers covered by the minimum wage who remain
employed, the latter emerge from the employment e￿ects of minimum wages. In
order to quantify the budgetary e￿ects of candidate minimum wages ml, we calculate
the change in the annual labor income of each group of workers j, using our measure
of wage compression cjl and the estimated employment changes ¢Ljl. Speci￿cally,
denoting average annual wages per full-time equivalent worker in group j before the
introduction of minimum wages as ¹ vj and the respective employment level as Lj,




¢vjLj + ¹ vj(1 + cjl)¢Ljl if ¢Ljl ¸ 0
¢vj(Lj + ¢Ljl) + ¹ vj¢Ljl if ¢Ljl < 0: (5)
9Concerning employment changes, we assume that those workers who loose their
jobs and those who gain employment receive the average wage in their respective
employment group.9
The changes in workers’ annual incomes are then evaluated by average tax
rates. On the revenue side of the public budget we distinguish the income tax, the
solidarity tax as well as social security contributions. Concerning the income tax
we assume tax rates of 3.4 percent of gross income for low-skilled, 5.1 percent for
semi-skilled and part-time, and 14.4 percent for high-skilled workers.10 For all ￿ve
groups of workers, the solidarity tax amounts to 5.5 percent of the income tax.
Social security contributions add up to 40.85 percent of gross income, consisting of
19.5 percent for the pension system, 6.5 percent for the unemployment insurance
system, 1.95 percent for long-term care insurance, and 13.9 percent for the health
insurance. Marginal employees are assumed to pay 2 percent of their gross income
for income and solidarity tax. Furthermore, they are assumed to pay the ￿xed
amount of 28 percent of gross labor income into the social security system.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 5 report the estimated e￿ects of introducing
a minimum wage on individual taxes and social security contributions. Summed
over both regions, the e￿ects are estimated to result in a decrease of the revenues
from these sources of about 3 billion e in the case of a minimum wage of 5.00
e. This result is driven by a decrease of revenues from these sources in West
Germany11, where the revenue loss resulting from the employment reduction due
to these minimum wages exceeds the revenue gains resulting from the higher
incomes of those who remain employed. Even though the introduction of min-
imum wages would decrease employment and hence reduce the revenues from
individual taxes, this negative e￿ect is overcompensated by increased revenues
resulting from an increased income of the incumbent employees in the case of
minimum wages of 7.50 and 10.00 e, respectively. Overall, these gains reach
about 0.8 billion e for a minimum wage of 7.50 e and about 8.2 billion e for
a minimum wage of 10 e. In addition, the positive e￿ects on revenues are the
result of employment shifts towards better educated workers ￿ and hence towards
groups that pay higher income taxes ￿ following the introduction of minimum wages.
Note that semi-skilled full-time workers are responsible for most of the
additional revenues generated from minimum wages.12 This group constitutes not
9This assumption may be unrealistic, because, for example, unemployed receiving employment
may be clustered at the lower end of the respective wage distribution. Consequently, the estimated
e￿ects on the revenues resulting from the introduction of minimum wages represent an upper
bound.
10The tax rates rely on the income statistics of the Federal Statistical O￿ce, Statistisches Bun-
desamt (2007a), for the respective income group.
11Separate estimates for East and West Germany are available from the authors upon request.
12The respective contributions of the di￿erent worker groups are available from the authors upon
10only the largest group among those we consider in our analysis, the average income
of this group is also substantially higher than the income of low-skilled full-time
workers. Finally, semi-skilled workers are substitutes to low-skilled, part-time, and
marginal workers. Therefore, the introduction of minimum wages will lead only to
moderate employment losses and small wage gains for this group.
In addition to individual taxes we also consider minimum wage e￿ects on
corporate tax revenues. The introduction of minimum wages threatens to lower
the pro￿ts of ￿rms and hence public revenues from corporate taxes for at least
two reasons: (i) increases in the labor costs and (ii) negative employment e￿ects
and, correspondingly, a lower output level. The following estimates assume, that
the increased wage costs and social security contributions of the ￿rms lead to a
proportional reduction of pro￿ts. This is a crude, albeit reasonable approximation.
Firms, for example, may pass on parts of the increased wage costs to the consumers
via higher prices, even though the possibilities for such a reaction are limited
by increasing global competition. To the extent that this happens, however, the
following numbers overestimate the true ￿scal e￿ects. On the other hand, our
estimates also do not consider the e￿ects of output reductions on ￿rm’s pro￿t.
This leads to an underestimation of the true ￿scal e￿ects. Unfortunately it is not
possible to determine which of these e￿ects dominates. Hence, the net e￿ect of
these potential biases cannot be evaluated.
The numbers reported in column (4) of Table 5 have been obtained by
assuming an average total corporate tax burden from the corporate income tax,
business tax and income tax of 25 percent of pro￿ts (see, for example, Gebhardt
and Siemers, 2008, and Lietmeyer and Petzold, 2005). For all scenarios considered,
the results show a signi￿cant reduction of the public revenues from corporate
taxes, reaching between 1.1 and 8.2 billion e. The majority of this reduction is
due to lower revenues in West Germany, while the e￿ects in East Germany are
relatively minor. The latter can be explained by the fact that only 20 percent
of the employees are working in East Germany. In addition, workers in the
East have lower wages and they work relatively more often part-time than West
German workers. Finally, especially in the East, the introduction of minimum
wages would lead to relatively strong employment losses. Because of these rea-
sons, a minimum wage would lead to a relatively moderate increase in the wage
costs, and hence to a lower estimate of the decrease of pro￿ts for East German ￿rms.
4.2 Expenditures
Concerning public expenditures, minimum wages and the resulting wage compres-
sion and employment e￿ects predominantly a￿ect the budget of the German Labor
O￿ce (BA). In our assessment of the e￿ects of minimum wages on the expenditures
request.
11of the BA for unemployment bene￿ts and active labor market policy, we maintain
the following assumptions: (i) labor market ￿ows into and out of employment
are exclusively coming from and going into the pool of the unemployed without
any change in the population outside the labor force; (ii) the fraction of workers
receiving unemployment bene￿ts (ALG I) and not social bene￿ts (ALG II) remains
constant13; (iii) a worker receiving ALG I generates annual expenditures of 13,320
e and an unemployed worker receiving ALG II generates annual expenditures of
12,480 e14.
Columns (5) and (6) of Table 5 document that the introduction of minimum
wages threatens to be associated with signi￿cant additional costs for the BA.
Aggregated over the two German regions, these costs may reach between 6.7 billion
e at a minimum wage rate of 5.00 e to 19.5 billion e at a minimum wage rate of
10.00 e. In all scenarios considered, these e￿ects are signi￿cant. Again, the biggest
share of these costs is generated in West Germany whereas the costs compared to
the population share are higher in the East.
Workers with a low income are able to receive ALG II-bene￿ts in addition to
their labor income. If a minimum wage increases income at the lower end of the
wage distribution, the number of workers entitled to these wage subsidies decreases.
The associated decrease in expenditures for wage subsidies have to be taken into
account when evaluating the ￿scal e￿ects of minimum wages. According to the
Bundesagentur f￿r Arbeit (2007b), 989,000 households received this type of wage
subsidies in January 2007. To quantify the potential e￿ect of reducing this number
via minimum wages, we assume that workers having an income of less than 400
e receive wage subsidies of 876 e, those with an income between 400 and 800 e
receive 751 e, and those with higher labor income 529 e per month. We further
assume that the latter of these three groups consists predominantly of low skilled
full-time working individuals.
The change in expenditures due to wage subsidies is calculated using the
estimated e￿ects on wage compression and employment changes resulting from
each candidate minimum wage discussed above. We further assume that workers
receiving wage subsidies are a￿ected in the same way as other workers in their
respective skill group and that these persons have the same probability of loosing
their job. If workers receiving wage subsidies loose their job, we assume that they
13In December 2006, this proportion was about 40%.
14Based on data from the the Bundesagentur f￿r Arbeit (2007a) for December 2007, these ex-
penditures consists of average unemployment bene￿ts of 760 e per month. To these bene￿ts we
add average monthly costs of 350 e per person receiving ALG I for measures of active labor market
policy (Bundesagentur f￿r Arbeit, 2006a). We further assume that the average monthly bene￿ts
of workers receiving ALG II are 880 e (Bundesagentur f￿r Arbeit, 2006b) and that these workers
on average generate monthly costs for active labor market policy of 160 e (Bundesagentur f￿r
Arbeit, 2006c). Note that we do not consider potential changes in administrative costs, assuming
that these costs represent ￿x costs of the BA.
12receive ALG I or ALG II. These persons are already taken into account in Columns
(5) and (6) of Table 5. If workers stay on their job with a higher wage, we assume
that the wage subsidies are reduced by the same amount.
Column (7) of Table 5 shows that the introduction of minimum wages reduce
the expenditures for wage subsidies. On the one hand, this reduction can be
explained by the fact that those workers who loose their job and get unemployed
receive ALG I or ALG II. In this case they are already taken into account. On the
other hand, total expenditures for wage subsidies decrease because the introduction
of minimum wages results in some workers currently receiving wage subsidies to
loose their entitlement. The reduction of expenditures due to these e￿ects is about
0.6 billion e at a minimum wage of 5.00 e, and 3.2 billion e at a minimum wage
rate of 10.00 e. The latter is about 37 percent of the current expenditures for wage
subsidies.
Column (8) of Table 5 summarizes our estimates of the impact of minimum
wages on the public budget. Our estimates suggest that the introduction of minimum
wages may be accompanied with a considerable ￿scal burden, reaching about 10
billion e or 9.8 percent of the total public budget expenditures of 1,016 billion e in
2007 (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2008) at a minimum wage rate of 5.00 e, about 12
billion e (or 1.2 percent of the total public budget in 2007) at a minimum wage rate
of 7.50 e, up to more than 16.6 billion e (or 1.6 percent of the total public budget
in 2007) at a minimum wage rate of 10.00 e.
5 Conclusion
Based on estimates of the e￿ects of minimum wages on the wage distribution and
employment level, this paper analyzes the ￿scal e￿ects of introducing minimum
wages in Germany. The employment e￿ects are obtained by estimating labor
demand elasticities for di￿erent types of workers using a dynamic labor demand
model. The introduction of minimum wages in Germany is estimated to have
signi￿cant employment e￿ects. A minimum wage rate of 7.50 e, for example, is
estimated to decrease (full-time equivalent) employment by almost 0.86 million and
a minimum wage rate of 10.00 e by more than 1.5 million. These job losses are
concentrated among marginal and low- and semi-skilled full-time workers.
Because of higher wages for the incumbent workers and an increase in the
demand for high-skilled workers, however, the introduction of minimum wages is
associated with an increase in total labor income, which in turn implies higher
public revenues from income tax and social security contributions. The higher
wage costs further implies a reduction of ￿rms’ pro￿ts leading to a decrease in
the public revenues from corporate taxes. In total, however, the introduction of
minimum wages will decrease public revenues, because the reduction of revenues
from corporate taxes can not be compensated by the revenue gains from income
13tax and social security contributions. The introduction of minimum wages further
leads to increased public expenditures resulting from the increased unemployment
and social bene￿t expenditures.
The results of this paper implies that Germany should abstain from introduc-
ing minimum wages. They are associated with signi￿cant job losses, especially for
those employees whose situation is intended to be meliorated by the introduction of
minimum wages. This implies that minimum wages can not be regarded to be an
e￿ective policy measure to ￿ght poverty. In addition, minimum wages are estimated
to lead to a ￿scal burden. Our analysis implies a ￿scal burden, which can reach
12 billion e at a minimum wage rate of 7.50 e and more than 16 billion e at a
minimum wage rate of 10.00 e.
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17Table 1: Employment and Hourly Wages in West and East Germany
Hourly Wages (SOEP) BA-Panel
Obs. 10th- Mean 90th- 90th/10th Employ- Wage
percentile percentile ratio ment sum
[e] [e] [e] [FTE] [mill. e]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
West Germany
Marginal 499 4.60 9.63 17.44 3.79 3,472,464 11,193
Part-Time 1279 6.13 13.13 21.02 3.43 3,242,959 57,649
Low-Skilled 611 4.05 11.96 20.32 5.02 2,059,650 50,880
Semi-Skilled 3666 9.02 17.06 27.47 3.05 10,800,000 348,000
High-Skilled 112 9.33 20.09 32.76 3.51 1,582,436 79,552
Total 6167 6.39 15.21 25.75 4.03 21,157,509 547,275
East Germany
Marginal 104 2.94 7.95 18.06 6.14 566,845 1,351
Part-Time 283 3.22 10.36 19.16 5.95 717,275 12,838
Low-Skilled 144 1.85 5.78 11.82 6.38 184,580 3,436
Semi-Skilled 1424 6.16 12.34 20.90 3.39 2,679,850 62,365
High-Skilled 44 7.60 14.81 21.80 2.87 449,380 17,340
Total 1999 3.91 11.28 20.04 5.12 4,597,930 97,330
Germany
Total 8166 6.05 14.51 24.15 3.99 25,755,439 644,605
Source: Own calculations based on the GSOEP, Wave 2007.
FTE: Full-time equivalents.
18Table 2: Minimum Wages and Wage Compression
























Minimum Wage ml = 5.00e
Marginal 14.28 4.29 10.52 9.63 9.73 1.06
Part-Time 6.62 4.03 13.77 13.13 13.19 0.49
Low-Skilled 17.66 3.94 13.69 11.96 12.15 1.57
Semi-Skilled 2.00 3.98 17.33 17.06 17.08 0.12
High-Skilled 3.63 3.66 20.71 20.09 20.14 0.24
Minimum Wage ml = 7.50e
Marginal 51.32 5.76 13.71 9.63 10.52 9.26
Part-Time 15.64 5.43 14.55 13.13 13.45 2.46
Low-Skilled 29.51 4.86 14.94 11.96 12.74 6.52
Semi-Skilled 5.97 5.66 17.78 17.06 17.17 0.64
High-Skilled 5.30 4.70 20.95 20.09 20.24 0.74
Minimum Wage ml = 10.00e
Marginal 74.14 6.63 18.23 9.63 12.13 25.92
Part-Time 34.23 7.19 16.22 13.13 14.09 7.32
Low-Skilled 46.88 6.28 16.98 11.96 13.71 14.57
Semi-Skilled 13.28 7.40 18.54 17.06 17.40 2.02
High-Skilled 10.09 6.60 21.60 20.09 20.43 1.71
East Germany
Minimum Wage ml = 5.00e
Marginal 30.90 3.55 9.91 7.95 8.39 5.62
Part-Time 17.53 3.25 11.87 10.36 10.66 2.96
Low-Skilled 56.43 2.74 9.71 5.78 7.05 22.05
Semi-Skilled 6.39 3.31 12.95 12.34 12.44 0.87
High-Skilled 0.97 4.89 14.91 14.81 14.81 0.01
Minimum Wage ml = 7.50e
Marginal 62.07 4.90 12.93 7.95 9.56 20.27
Part-Time 35.65 4.86 13.40 10.36 11.30 9.07
Low-Skilled 72.36 3.62 11.43 5.78 8.59 48.57
Semi-Skilled 22.63 5.69 14.28 12.34 12.74 3.32
High-Skilled 8.93 6.30 15.65 14.81 14.92 0.72
Minimum Wage ml = 10.00e
Marginal 79.51 5.84 16.14 7.95 11.26 41.66
Part-Time 58.12 6.39 15.86 10.36 12.45 20.26
Low-Skilled 83.34 4.26 13.35 5.78 10.56 82.72
Semi-Skilled 39.39 6.99 15.81 12.34 13.52 9.62
High-Skilled 22.90 7.30 17.04 14.81 15.43 4.17
Source: Own calculations based on the GSOEP, Wave 2007.
19Table 3: Uncompensated elasticities of substitution
Percentage With respect to a percentage change
change in the in the wage of:
employment of: Marginal Part-Time Low-Skilled Semi-Skilled High-Skilled
West Germany
Marginal -0.889y 0.058 0.146y 0.456y 0.026
(0.040) (0.057) (0.069) (0.100) (0.074)
[-0.005] [-0.019] [-0.020] [-0.129] [-0.029]
Part-Time 0.015 -0.644y 0.033 0.268y 0.125y
(0.015) (0.066) (0.057) (0.112) (0.055)
[-0.005] [-0.019] [-0.020] [-0.129] [-0.029]
Low-Skilled 0.039y 0.036 -0.861y 0.479y 0.104y
(0.018) (0.054) (0.067) (0.089) (0.049)
[-0.005] [-0.019] [-0.020] [-0.129] [-0.029]
Semi-Skilled 0.019y 0.045y 0.075y -0.388y 0.046y
(0.005) (0.023) (0.016) (0.038) (0.023)
[-0.005] [-0.019] [-0.020] [-0.129] [-0.029]
High-Skilled 0.005 0.087y 0.069y 0.192y -0.556y
(0.014) (0.039) (0.031) (0.092) (0.087)
[-0.005] [-0.019] [-0.020] [-0.129] [-0.029]
East Germany
Marginal -0.733y 0.091 0.120 0.284 0.033
(0.091) (0.063) (0.119) (0.264) (0.246)
[-0.003] [-0.025] [-0.008] [-0.133] [-0.036]
Part-Time 0.011 -0.728y -0.024 0.418y 0.117y
(0.008) (0.049) (0.018) (0.064) (0.039)
[-0.003] [-0.025] [-0.008] [-0.133] [-0.036]
Low-Skilled 0.045 -0.074 -0.638y 0.609y -0.147
(0.042) (0.053) (0.123) (0.174) (0.156)
[-0.003] [-0.025] [-0.008] [-0.133] [-0.036]
Semi-Skilled 0.007 0.081y 0.036y -0.422y 0.093y
(0.006) (0.021) (0.011) (0.033) (0.029)
[-0.003] [-0.025] [-0.008] [-0.133] [-0.036]
High-Skilled 0.003 0.082y -0.032 0.330y -0.588y
(0.019) (0.032) (0.035) (0.088) (0.098)
[-0.003] [-0.025] [-0.008] [-0.133] [-0.036]
Source: Jacobi and Scha￿ner (2008), Tables 2 and 3, and own calculations.
Boot-strapped standard errors in parentheses. Output e￿ect in brackets.
y: Statistically signi￿cant at least at the 5%-level.
20Table 4: Employment E￿ects of Minimum Wages
Worker Minimum Wage ml =
Group 5.00 e 7.50 e 10.00 e
West Germany
Marginal 47,472 -172,384 -622,237
[40,053;54,891] [-210,161;-134,607] [-714,993;-529,481]
(-2,458) (-11,820) (-31,337)
Part-Time -8,014 -33,402 -102,138
[-13,960;-2,068] [-59,463;-7,341] [-163,355;-40,921]
(-2,249) (-10,816) (-28,674)
Low-Skilled -110,745 -180,947 -286,420
[-114,349;-107,142] [-195,631;-166,262] [-318,779;-254,060]
(-1,369) (-6,584) (-17,454)
Semi-Skilled -284,464 -238,423 -169,402
[-289,627;-279,301] [-260,937;-215,909] [-222,992;-115,812]
(-7,288) (-35,048) (-92,916)
High-Skilled -6,345 -391 12,006
[-7,661;-5,028] [-6,425;5,643] [-2,518;26,530]
(-1,093) (-5,257) (-13,938)




Marginal -19,783 -54,549 -102,476
[-47,415;7,849] [-102,476;6,381] [-203,082;-1,870]
(-2,154) (-6,394) (-15,175)
Part-Time -17,513 -44,803 -85,467
[-22,780;-12,246] [-85,467;-33,232] [-104,640;-66,295]
(-2,791) (-8,286) (-19,665)
Low-Skilled -32,976 -59,865 -92,007
[-42,212;-23,739] [-92,007;-39,691] [-125,068;-58,946]
(-684) (-2,029) (-4,815)
Semi-Skilled -78,226 -63,057 -64,440
[-89,879;-66,572] [-64,440;-37,610] [-106,261;-22,619]
(-10,074) (-29,902) (-70,965)
High-Skilled -12,893 -12,581 -12,921
[-19,712;-6,073] [-12,921;2,570] [-38,267;12,425]
(-1,705) (-5,061) (-12,011)
Total -161,391 -234,855 -357,311
[-221,999;-100,782] [-357,311;-101,582] [-577,317;-137,304]
(-17,408) (-51,672) (-122,630)
Source: Own calculations based on the elasticities reported in Jacobi and Scha￿ner (2008).
95 percent con￿dence intervals in brackets. Output e￿ects in parentheses.
21Table 5: Fiscal E￿ects of Minimum Wages (in Mill. e)
Minimum Wage
5.00 e 7.50 e 10.00 e
Income and Solidarity Tax -361 124 1,147
[-461;-261] [-168;416] [541;1,752]
Social Security -2,516 653 7,032
[-3,078;-1,954] [-1,064;2,370] [3,352;10,647]
Corporate Taxes -1,085 -3,475 -8,209
[-655;-1,515] [-2,159;-4,791] [-5,408;-11,010]
Unemployment Bene￿ts
ALG I -2,789 -4,584 -8,128
[-3,237;-2,341] [-5,807;-3,303] [-10,656;-5,600]
ALG II -3,920 -6,443 -11,423
[-4,549;-3,291] [-8,162;-4,643] [-14,976;-7,870]
Wage Subsidies 580 1,528 3,190
[597;565] [1,598;1,457] [3,339;3,041]
Total -10,090 -12,197 -16,391
(5.28%) (16.73%) (31.99%)
Source: Own calculations. 95 percent con￿dence intervals in brackets.
Shares of output e￿ects in parentheses.
22A Estimation of price-elasticities of labor demand
Following Jacobi and Scha￿ner (2008), we postulate a system of cost share equations
that is derived from a standard translog cost function,
Sit = ¯i +
5 X
j=1
¯ij lnwjt + ¯iy lnYt + ¯ik lnKt + ¯iv lnVt + ¯itQt + uit; (6)
where Sit is the wage bill of workers of group i = 1;:::;5, expressed as a share of
the overall wage costs in an industry at time t, while wj indicates the wage of group
j, output is represented by Yt, Kt is the capital stock, Vt intermediate input, Qt a
vector of period dummies, and uit a random disturbance term. Thus, capital and
intermediate inputs are treated as quasi-￿xed inputs and output is held constant
as well. Since the shares Sit always sum to unity, each of the share equations
can be expressed as a linear combination of the others. Therefore the system of
share equations is singular and cannot be estimated without additional identifying
restrictions. Typically, one of the equations is omitted and the following conditions,














¯ix = 0 8x = y;k;v;t: (8)
The static model speci￿ed in equation (6) assumes that ￿rms always produce
on their long-run optimal level, i.e. it is assumed that costs are minimized with
respect to all input factors and that adjustment occurs instantaneously and without
costs. The assumption of instantaneous adjustment, however, does not appear to
be realistic, because ￿rms have incomplete information on future input and output
prices. Furthermore, the adjustment of output and employment in reaction to
price changes involves costs such as hiring and ￿ring costs or costs for ￿rm-speci￿c
training. Because of these costs, adjustment is typically delayed, leading to an
autocorrelation of the error terms of the cost function as well as the share equations.
To take adjustment costs into account, Jacobi and Scha￿ner (2008) employ
the General Error Correction Model (GECM) proposed by Anderson and Blundell
(1982). Under the assumption that the lag structures of the dependent and indepen-
dent variables are the same, speci￿cation tests suggest that the best-￿tting dynamic
speci￿cation of the GECM includes only one lag. Using the summing-up conditions,



























for i = 1;:::;4. The authors use a ￿xed-e￿ects approach to account for heterogeneity
on the industry level and seasonal e￿ects. Based on model (9), the own-price (´ii)








+ Si ¡ 1 8i (11)
The estimates are performed using di￿erent data sources. Information on
employment and wages on the industry level is taken from the Employment Panel, a
2% sample drawn from quarterly employment statistics of the Federal Employment
Agency, which registers all individuals subject to social security contribution at
a given date (see Koch and Meineken, 2004). Note that the data does not cover
civil servants and most self-employed individuals. The empirical analysis of Jacobi
and Scha￿ner (2008) covers the period from the 2nd quarter of 1999, which is the
￿rst wave with information on marginal part-time workers, to the fourth quarter of
2005.
The data set contains roughly 226,000 individuals, providing information on
basic individual characteristics, occupational characteristics and some characteris-
tics of the establishment. Wages are censored above by the assessment threshold
for social security contributions ("Bemessungsgrenze"). Median wages are, how-
ever, not a￿ected by censoring. Missing information on the level of education is
imputed using information of previous or subsequent waves (for non-students only).
Furthermore, individual data is aggregated on the 2-digit industry level, excluding
agriculture, ￿shery, forestry, mining, and private households to guarantee reliable
￿gures for each cell. Due to the smaller sample size, more industries have to be
grouped in Eastern Germany. The ￿nal data set used for estimation represents a
panel of 27 waves and 40 industries for West and 23 industries for East Germany.
To generate the total number of full-time equivalent employees and the medium
gross wage per hour by employment category for each wave and industry, Jacobi
and Scha￿ner (2008) merged the Employment Sample with data on working hours
24from the Microcensus. Because the Microcensus provides data only on a yearly ba-
sis, the same information on working hours is used for each wave within a given year.
Data on the output (gross value added), the net capital stock, intermediate
inputs, and de￿ators on the 2-digit industry level are taken from national accounts
(Statistisches Bundesamt, 2007b). Because information is not available on the re-
gional level, the authors use the same national data for West and East Germany.
Quarterly data on the net capital stock is not available. Therefore, quarterly data
of investment is used assuming that depreciation is constant within each year. All
variables are measured in constant prices of the year 2000.
B Taking the output e￿ect into account
Additionally to the approach of Jacobi and Scha￿ner (2008), we estimate uncom-
pensated elasticities. In a translog cost function approach, pro￿t functions have
to be estimated simultaneously to quantify output e￿ects. Because of the lack of
adequate pro￿t data, we rely on the approach of Fitzenberger and Franz (2001)
who estimate output e￿ects without a pro￿t function.
Their approach is based on the commodity demand Y in an industry, which is
de￿ned as an isoelastic function of the output price p:
ln(Y ) = ln(D) + ´ ¢ ln(p); (12)
where D is an industry- and time-speci￿c autonomous demand term. It is assumed
that ￿rms (industries) maximize their pro￿ts under monopolistic competition:
max p(Y ) ¢ Y ¡ C(Y );

















where MC are the marginal costs of production. Under the assumption of a constant
elasticity ´, the output elasticity with respect to a change of the wage in group k,














The advantage of this approach is that it is only necessary to estimate
@ ln(MC)
@ ln(wk) and
the demand elasticity ´ instead of the pro￿t function.








To simplify, Fitzenberger and Franz (2001) assume that the labor demand elasticities










































Table 6: Compensated elasticities of substitution
Percentage change in With respect to a percentage change in the wage of:
the employment of: Marginal Part-Time Low-Skilled Semi-Skilled High-Skilled
West Germany
Marginal -0.8837 0.0773 0.1662 0.5845 0.0557
(0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.11) (0.08)
Part-Time 0.0203 -0.6248 0.0531 0.3974 0.1540
(0.02) (0.07) (0.06) (0.12) (0.06)
Low-Skilled 0.0448 0.0544 -0.8401 0.6078 0.1331
(0.02) (0.06) (0.07) (0.10) (0.05)
Semi-Skilled 0.0247 0.0640 0.0955 -0.2590 0.0748
(0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02)
High-Skilled 0.0101 0.1063 0.0896 0.3208 -0.5269
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.09) (0.08)
East Germany
Marginal -0.7302 0.1158 0.1280 0.4173 0.0691
(0.09) (0.06) (0.11) (0.23) (0.24)
Part-Time 0.0136 -0.7028 -0.0152 0.5513 0.1532
(0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.06) (0.04)
Low-Skilled 0.0484 -0.0491 -0.6302 0.7416 -0.1107
(0.04) (0.05) (0.14) (0.19) (0.15)
Semi-Skilled 0.0095 0.1066 0.0445 -0.2891 0.1286
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03)
High-Skilled 0.0056 0.1067 -0.0239 0.4633 -0.5517
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.09) (0.09)
Source: Jacobi and Scha￿ner (2008), Tables 2 and 3.
Boot-strapped standard errors in parentheses.
27